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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court, which has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(j)(1953 
as amended), has assigned this case to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(4). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Union Pacific believes the issues on review can be stated as follows: (1) Is Alecia 
Jensen's ("Jensen") claim of negligent train speed preempted by federal law? (2) Was the 
trial court correct in ruling as a matter of law that the speed of the train, as alleged by Jensen, 
was not a proximate cause of the accident? (3) Was the trial court correct in ruling as a 
matter of law that Union Pacific was not responsible for any unsafe conditions which may 
have been present at the crossing at the time of the accident and which may have created "a 
more than ordinarily hazardous" crossing? and (4) Was the trial court correct in ruling that 
there was no genuine issue of material fact in dispute that Union Pacific sounded the train's 
bell and whistle as it approached the crossing? 
Upon review of a grant of a motion for summaiy judgment, the Appellate Court views 
the facts in a light most favorable to the losing party below, and gives no deference to the 
trial court's conclusions of law, which are reviewed for correctness. Blue Cross & Blue 
Shield v. State. 779 P.2d 634 (Utah 1989). 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND REGULATIONS 
45 U.S.C.A. § 434 (Federal Rail Safety Act of 1970): 
The Congress declares that laws, rules, regulations, 
orders, and standards relating to railroad safety shall be 
nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State may adopt 
or continue in force any law, rule, regulation, order, or standard 
relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary has 
adopted a rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the 
subject matter of such State requirement. A State may adopt or 
continue in force an additional or more stringent law, rule, 
regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad safety when 
necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety 
hazard, and when not incompatible with any Federal law, rule, 
regulation, order, or standard, and when not creating an undue 
burden on interstate commerce. 
49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a): Classes of track: operating speed limits. 
Except as provided in paragraphs (b) and (c) of this 
section and § § 213.57, 213.59(a), 213.113(a), and 213.137(b) 
and (c), the following maximum allowable operating speeds 
apply: 
Over track that meets all of the re-
quirements prescribed in this part 
far-
Class 1 track 
Class 2 track 
Class 3 track 
Class 4 track 
Class 5 track 
Class 6 track 
The maxi-
mum al-
lowable 
operating 
speed for 
freight 
trains I S -
10 
25 
40 
60 
80 
110 
The maxi-
mum al-
lowable 
operating 
speed for 
passenger 
trains is— 
15 
30 
60 
80 
90 
110 
49 C.F R. § 213.9 is set forth in its entirety in Addendum A. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Union Pacific generally agrees with Jensen's statement of the nature of the case. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Union Pacific supplements Jensen's statement of the course of proceedings and 
disposition below as follows: 
Union Pacific timely filed its Reply Memorandum on March 8, 1995, arguing, inter 
alia- that Jensen's expert witness affidavits concerning the speed limit and speed of the train 
were incompetent, conclusionaiy, and legally insufficient to raise any genuine issue of fact. 
In response, Jensen filed a motion on March 14, 1995, for leave to submit an additional 
expert witness affidavit. Union Pacific responded by filing an objection to the motion on the 
grounds that that affidavit was also inadmissible because it made legal conclusion % 
contained inadmissible hearsay testimony, and contained testimony that was irrelevant. The 
court did not rule on either the motion or the objection concerning the admissibility of such 
evidence. 
Jensen was a passenger in her automobile which was being driven at the time offhe, 
accident by her 17 year old boyfriend, Bruce Brinkmeier. Brinkmeier was never includes 
or added as a defendant in the lawsuit; however, on April 10, 1995, Union Pacific filec? 
motion to name him as an additional defendant for the limited purpose of apportioning fauli 
The trial court did not address this motion. 
On April 11, 1995, Union Pacific submitted a Supplemental Reply Memorar&iiL* 
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bringing the Court's attention to a recently discovered group of cases directly supportive of 
Union Pacific's argument that even assuming, arguendo, a train speed of 1-2 m.p.h. over the 
effective speed limit, as argued by Jensen, such speed could not possibly have been a 
proximate cause of the accident. It was on this basis, rather than the argument of federal 
preemption, that the trial court decided the issue of negligent train speed. 
Statement of Facts 
Jensen, age 17, was seriously injured when the automobile in which she was riding 
as a passenger drove in front of and was struck by a Union Pacific coal train. The accident 
occurred at approximately 12:10 p.m. on February 5, 1994, at a public railroad crossing of 
Union Pacific's Provo Subdivision mainline trackage located near 650 West and 5950 South 
in Spanish Fork. [Utah County Sheriffs Investigation File ("Sheriffs File"), R. 143-123]. 
According to Jensen's Interrogatory Answers (No. 14), Jensen's car, a 1982 Honda 
Civic, had been purchased and was owned by Danny Jensen, Jensen's father, for Jensen's 
personal use. The car was being driven at the time of the accident by Jensen's boyfriend, 
Bruce Brinkmeier, also age 17. Brinkmeier was not licensed to drive an automobile, and 
received a citation for not being licensed following the accident. (Sheriffs File, R. 143-123). 
The train was traveling from Milford to Provo in a southwest to northeast direction. 
The trackage at the location of the crossing is relatively straight and flat. The road (650 
West) travels in a north/south direction and the car was traveling southbound. The road is 
straight and flat for hundreds of feet before reaching the crossing. The trackage and road 
intersect at a greater that 90° angle with reference to the directions of approach for the train 
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and car. [Sheriffs File, R. 143-123; Lawrence Curley Affidavit ("Curley Affidavit") with 
appended diagram and photographs, R. 121-106]. 
The crossing is located in a rural farming area and is surrounded by open fields on the 
approach side. A Utah Livestock Auction building and animal pens are located in the 
southwest quadrant of the crossing intersection, which is on the opposite side of the tracks 
from which Jensen's automobile approached. The building and pens are located off the 
railroad right of way. The northwest quadrant of the crossing intersection, which is the view 
quadrant for the approaching train and car, is an open field. (Curley Affidavit, R. 121-106; 
Aerial photograph, R. 104). 
650 West is an asphalted road and the railroad crossing was planked and asphalted. 
An advance stop sign warning sign was posted along side 650 West at approximately 572 feet 
north of the crossing. An advance railroad crossing warning sign was posted along side the 
road at approximately 332 feet north of the crossing. An advance railroad crossing warning 
sign was painted on the road surface at approximately 281 feet north of the crossing. 
Another railroad crossing warning sign, somewhat faded but still observable, was painted on 
the road surface at approximately 175 feet north of the crossing. Stop signs and railroad 
crossing "crossbuck" signs were located on both sides of the crossing. The stop and 
crossbuck signs on the north side were located approximately 17 and 9 1/2 feet, respectively, 
away from the tracks. White stop sign stop lines were painted on the roadway surface on 
both sides of the crossing approximately 22 feet away from the tracks. All of these signs, 
with the possible exception of the second painted road sign, were in excellent condition and 
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easily visible to motorists approaching the crossing in a southbound direction. (Curley 
Affidavit, R. 121-106). 
The train was an empty coal train with three locomotives and 46 trailing empty coal 
cars. The train weighed 1424 tons and was 2622 feet in length. The locomotives were 
painted yellow and ranged in height from 15 1/2 feet to a little over 16 feet. The total length 
of the three yellow locomotives which were coupled end to end was approximately 200 feet. 
[Curley Affidavit, R. 121-106; Ryan Puffer Affidavit ("Puffer Affidavit"), R. 102-98]. 
The federally set speed limit for the trackage and train in question was 60 m.p.h. By 
means of an internal "Timetable" rule, Union Pacific had voluntarily imposed a 50 m.p.h. 
speed limit for its freight trains. [49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a), R. 88-87; William VanTrump 
Affidavit ("VanTrump Affidavit"), R. 96-95; Puffer Affidavit, R. 102-98]. 
Ryan Puffer was the engineer of the train and was controlling the train's movements 
from the cab of the leading locomotive. He was operating the train at approximately 50 
m.p.h. as the train approached the crossing and at the time he placed the train into emergency 
braking just before the accident. He monitored the train speed by means of a speedometer 
in the cab of the leading locomotive. [Puffer Affidavit, R. 102-98; George Ohlsson Affidavit 
("Ohlsson Affidavit"), R. 93-90]. 
Federal law found at 49 C.F.R. § 229.117 (Addendum C), requires every locomotive 
operating in excess of 20 m.p.h. to be equipped with a "speed indicator" accurate within ± 
5 m.p.h. at speeds above 30 m.p.h. One of the train's locomotives (No. 3799) was equipped 
with such a speed indicator, which is sometimes referred to as a "speed recorder" or "event 
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recorder." A tape printed out from the speed indicator device shows the train to be traveling 
between 49 and 51 m.p.h. for at least the last three miles before braking was initiated. 
(Ohlsson Affidavit, R. 93-90). 
The speed indicator on locomotive 3799 was of the older "8 track" cassette type which 
does not have sufficient channels to record the operation of the whistle. While the speed 
indicator printout tape has a "horn" line where whistle activation can be shown if recorded 
by the device, the speed indicator was not equipped to make such a recording. (Ohlsson 
Affidavit, R. 90). Accordingly, the fact that there are no printout markings on the hom line 
is not evidence that the whistle was not sounded. It is evidence only that the speed indicator 
was not capable of making the whistle recording. [Supplemental Affidavit of George 
Ohlsson ("Supplemental Ohlsson Affidavit"), R. 259-257]. 
The leading locomotive (No. 9390), was equipped with two headlights which were 
operating on high beam as the train approached the crossing. (Puffer Affidavit, R. 102-98; 
Curley Affidavit, R. 121-106). 
Engineer Puffer was sounding the locomotive whistle and bell as the train approached 
the crossing. He began sounding the whistle and bell approximately 1/4 mile away from the 
5950 South crossing and continued to sound the whistle and bell from the 5950 South 
crossing on up to the point of the accident at 650 West. The distance between the 5950 
South and 650 West crossings is approximately 1100 feet. (Puffer Affidavit, R. 102-98 
Sheriffs File, R. 143-123; Curley Affidavit, R. 121-106). 
At about the time the train passed over the 5950 South crossing, Engineer Puff 
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noticed a truck pulling a horse trailer begin to drive over the tracks in a southbound direction. 
Puffer focused his attention on the truck/horse trailer to make certain that it would get out 
of the way. Puffer was sounding the whistle and bell as he watched the truck/horse trailer 
drive over the crossing. (Puffer Affidavit, R. 102-98; Sheriffs File, R. 143-123.) 
The whistle and bell were operating properly and the whistle was a particularly loud 
whistle. The locomotive bell was also ringing. Engineer Puffer turned the bell on when he 
started sounding the whistle for the 5950 South crossing. He never turned the bell off until 
after the accident. Puffer operated the whistle and bell continuously from more than one 
quarter mile away up to the point of the accident. (Puffer Affidavit, R. 102-98). 
Shortly after seeing the truck/horse trailer clear the crossing, Puffer noticed the Jensen 
car rolling towards the crossing. The car was following a few seconds behind the truck/horse 
trailer and moving past the stop sign. Puffer had the impression that the car never stopped 
for the stop sign. The car rolled onto the track directly in front of the train. (Puffer 
Affidavit, R. 102-98; Sheriffs File, R. 143-123). 
The train was a few hundred feet from the crossing when engineer Puffer first saw the 
Jensen car approaching the crossing. Puffer placed the train into emergency braking 
immediately upon seeing the Jensen car. (Puffer Affidavit, R. 102-98). 
According to Jensen's Interrogatory Answers (Nos. 15 and 35), Brinkmeier and Jensen 
had come from Brinkmeier's home in Salt Lake City, with Brinkmeier driving, to the place 
of the accident. The purpose of the drive was to visit Brinkmeier's foster parents who lived 
in the area and to see where Brinkmeier had worked just north of the crossing. 
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Brinkmeierfs deposition was never taken nor did he give an affidavit. However 
according to a recorded statement of Brinkmeier, a transcription of which was attached as 
an exhibit to Jensen's Memorandum in Opposition to Union Pacific's Motion (R. 178-158), 
Brinkmeier and Jensen were playing a "wish" game upon arrival at the crossing. They did 
so by lifting their feet up off the floor of the car and touching something metallic with their 
fingers while at the same time making a wish and crossing the tracks. Jensen agrees that they 
may have been playing this game. [Brinkmeier Statement, R. 168-166; Affidavit of Alecia 
Jensen ("Jensen Affidavit"), R. 181-180]. 
Brinkmeier and Jensen never saw nor heard the train at any time before impact. They 
were playing the game and looking in a forward and/or upward direction to try and find a 
metal screw to touch as the car was at or near the stop sign. They did not look or listen for 
train traffic because of being preoccupied with playing the game. (Jensen Affidavit, 
R. 181-180; Sheriffs File, R. 143-123). 
In Jensen's Answer to Interrogatory No. 25, which specifically requested that she 
identify "any and all obstructions to your vision of the train's approach and railroad 
crossing," Jensen answered: "I do not recall if the view was obstructed." (R. 265). In her 
subsequent affidavit response to Union Pacific's Motion for Summary Judgment, Jensen 
recalled "that there were a lot of trucks and trailers which obstructed our view of the tracks 
in all directions." (Jensen Affidavit, R. 181). 
In Jensen's Answer to Interrogatory No. 26, responding to the question of how the 
accident happened, she stated: "I remember nothing of the accident and very little, if 
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anything, of what happened prior to the accident." (R. 218). In her affidavit later submitted 
in opposition to Union Pacific's motion, Jensen stated that she did not recall playing the wish 
game (but may have been); but did remember traffic congestion at the crossing which 
obstructed the view of the tracks in all directions; and did recall never hearing or seeing the 
train. (Jensen Affidavit, R. 181-180). This is Jensen's only evidence of noise and traffic 
congestion at the crossing. 
Brinkmeier, in his recorded statement attached to Jensen's Memorandum in 
Opposition, stated that he was "not paying attention" at the crossing and "never heard 
anything." (R. 164). 
Independent witnesses Gerald and Whitney Hill and Johnny Starks were interviewed 
by the Utah County Sheriffs Office. They provided written statements to the Sheriffs Office 
but no depositions or affidavits were obtained in the lawsuit. The Hills made no reference 
to whether the whistle was or was not sounded—the subject was not addressed at all. 
However, Starks advised that, "I heard the train honking." (Sheriffs File, R. 139, 135, 134, 
131). 
In addition to being cited for not having a driver's license, Brinkmeier was also cited 
for "failure to stop at stop sign." (Sheriffs File, R. 143-123). 
Emergency braking is the quickest way to stop a train, but because the car was so 
close, it was not possible to slow the train before impact. It took the train approximately 1400 
feet to stop after emergency braking was initiated. The brakes operated normally and the 
stop was a good one under the circumstances. It was not possible for engineer Puffer to stop 
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the train any quicker. Puffer did everything within his power to warn of the train's approach 
and to stop the train after suddenly perceiving that the car may not stop. (Puffer Affidavit, 
R. 102-98; Curley Affidavit, R. 121-106). 
The left side of the snowplow of the leading locomotive struck the right front portion 
of the Jensen car, throwing it in a northeasterly direction. Both occupants were ejected from 
the car and thrown in the same northeasterly direction. Neither occupant was wearing a seat 
belt. (Sheriffs File, R. 143-123; Curley Affidavit, R. 121-106; Puffer's Affidavit, R. 
102-98). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. There is no factual dispute that the train's speed was in the range of 49-52 
m.p.h. at the time of the accident. Such speed is not unreasonable, excessive or negligent 
as a matter of law since it is within the 60 m.p.h. limit established by the Federal Railroad 
Administration ("FRA") in 49 C.F.R. 213.9(a), which limit preempts any common law claim 
that the train should have been traveling at a slower speed. The 60 m.p.h. speed limit 
specified in § 213.9(a) preempts any claim of excessive speed based upon Union Pacific's 
timetable speed limit of 50 m.p.h. which was a limit voluntarily set by the Railroad and does 
not have the effect of an enforceable regulation and cannot be used as the basis for a 
negligent speed claim. In any event, a speed of 51 or 52 m.p.h. cannot be considered is 
violating even the Railroad's timetable limit of 50 m.p.h. in view of the ± 5 m.p.h. vari&.Ion 
required by 49 C.F.R. 229.117, nor can a speed of 1-2 m.p.h. over the speed limit, whatever 
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it was, be considered a proximate cause of the accident as a matter of law. 
2. Jensen offered no probative evidence that Union Pacific did not comply with 
the whistle statute, and no genuine issue of material fact exists on that issue. Jensen's 
affidavit testimony that she did not hear the whistle is not admissible or probative because 
it contradicts her earlier interrogatory answer, and because it is negative testimony. The 
unverified and unsworn statements of Jensen's other "whistle witnesses" are inadmissible and 
not probative of the issue of whether the whistle was sounded. The speed indicator printout 
is not evidence that the whistle was not sounded-only that the speed indicator did not record 
the whistle. The only admissible, probative evidence on this issue is the affidavit testimony 
of Engineer Puffer who is very clear that the whistle was appropriate sounded. 
3. Jensen offered no probative evidence that the crossing was more than 
ordinarily hazardous. Her affidavit testimony of obstructions to view should be disregarded 
because it contradicts her earlier answers to interrogatories. The law imposed no duty of 
additional care on Union Pacific with respect to the condition of the crossing or handling of 
the train. The obstructions, if any, created by the Utah Livestock Auction premises were off 
the right of way and not under Union Pacific's control, and as a matter of law, Union Pacific 
had no duty to signalize the crossing or reduce any further the speed of the train under the 
federally mandated speed limit. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
JENSEN'S CLAIM OF NEGLIGENT TRAIN SPEED IS 
PREEMPTED BY FEDERAL LAW. 
The "authorized speed limit" for the train and trackage in question was set by the 
Federal Railroad Administration at 60 mp.h., 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a), and such limit preempts 
Jensen's claim of excessive train speed as a matter of law. CSX Transp.r Inc. v. Easterwood. 
113 S.Ct. 732; 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). In Easterwood the plaintiff sued for the death of 
her husband caused in a railroad crossing accident, alleging the same common law 
negligence claims made by Jensen, of excessive train speed and a crossing that was unsafe. 
CSX argued, inter alia, that plaintiffs claim of excessive train speed was preempted under 
49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a), and the Supreme Court agreed. In rendering its decision, the Supreme 
Court clarified the extent to which federal railroad safety laws and regulations preempt state 
laws concerning train movements. The Court held that federal regulations implemented 
pursuant to the Federal Rail Safety Act of 1970,45 U.S.C. § 434, may preempt any state law, 
rule, etc., including, "legal duties imposed on railroads by the common law," 123 L.Ed.2d 
at 396; and that plaintifFs common law negligence allegation of excessive train speed was 
preempted by the maximum speed limits established by the FRA. The Court stated: 
On their face, the provisions of § 213.9(a) address only the 
maximum speeds at which trains are permitted to travel given 
the nature of the track on which they operate. Nevertheless, 
related safety regulations adopted by the Secretary reveal that 
the limits were adopted only after the hazards posed by track 
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conditions were taken into account. Understood in the context 
of the overall structure of the regulations, the speed limits must 
be read as not only establishing a ceiling, but also precluding 
additional state regulation of the sort which respondent seeks to 
impose on petitioner. 
123 L.Ed.2d at 402-03. Subsequent federal district court decisions, following Easterwood 
have further interpreted 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a) to preempt state common law claims based 
upon a railroad's violation of its "internal policies" requiring adherence to municipal speed 
restrictions. Bowman v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co.. 832 F.Supp. 1014, 1017 (D.S.C. 1993); 
and state common law claims based upon a railroad's violation of local speed ordinances, Id.; 
Landrum v. Norfolk Southern Corp.. 836 F.Supp. 373, 375 (S.D. Miss. 1993). 
In the present case it is undisputed that the train was operating within the federally 
set speed limit of 60 m.p.h. The fact that Union Pacific had voluntarily set a lower "internal 
policy" timetable speed limit of 50 m.p.h. is irrelevant since any claim based upon a violation 
of the railroad set limit is still a state common law negligence claim which is preempted by 
49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a). Id,. Accordingly, since the issue of train speed limits has been 
specifically preempted by federal law and Union Pacific's train was operating within the 
federal limit, the train's speed, whether it was 49,50, 51 or 52 m.p.h. cannot provide a basis 
for Jensen arguing a state common law negligence theory. 
1. 49 C.F.R § 217 Does Not Authorize Timetables to Change 
the Federal Speed Limits Set in 49 C.F.R. § 213.9. 
In an effort to circumvent the defense of federal preemption of train speed limits, 
Jensen argues that since 49 C.F.R. § 217 (actually § 217.7) (Addendum B) requires railroad 
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timetables be filed with the FRA, § 217.7 thereby makes Union Pacific's timetable speed of 
50 m.p.h. the enforceable federal speed limit in this case. While § 217.7 does require 
railroads to file their operating rules and timetables, etc., with the FRA, it says nothing about 
the provisions of such rules becoming enforceable federal regulations or that timetable speed 
limits filed with the FRA under this section preempt or become an exception to the speed 
limits specifically set by 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a). 
Realizing that § 217.7 makes no such provision or mention, Jensen offered the 
affidavits of Bruce Reading and Robert Hitson to inappropriately make the erroneous legal 
conclusions that railroad speed limits filed with the FRA under § 217.7 become enforceable 
federal regulations. Such testimony is inadmissible under Rule 704, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
which does not allow a witness, expert or not, to give legal conclusions. Davidson v. Prince. 
813 P.2d 1225 (Utah Ct. App.), QSTL denied. 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). Clearly, Bruce 
Readings1 assertion that the federal speed limits set in 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a) are "clarified and 
restricted" by 49 C.F.R. § 217, is a legal conclusion and should be disregarded. The case of 
Wright v. Illinois Central R. Co. 868 F.Supp. 183 (S.D. Miss. 1994) is directly in point. 
There, plaintiffs alleged that the railroad was negligent in "operating its train at an excessive 
speed just prior to and at the time of the collision." The passenger train was traveling 79 
m.p.h. which was within the FRA speed limit of 80 m.p.h. [as set forth in 49 C.F.R. § 
231.9(a)], but in excess of the limit set by a municipal speed ordinance. The Railroads 
"internal policies" (undoubtedly found in the Railroad's operating rules or timetable), 
required the Railroad to comply with municipal speed ordinances. In support of thei; 
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argument that the Railroad was negligent for violating the municipal speed limit, plaintiffs 
offered the conclusionaiy testimony of an expert witness that the FRA regulations pertained 
only to "open tracks, and not to tracks within municipal or residential districts;" thus, the 
regulations did not preempt plaintiffs' claim. I& at 187. In ruling that the expert's testimony 
was a legal conclusion and did "not create a genuine issue of material fact," the Court stated: 
This assertion by [the expert] is unsupported by law or statute, 
and amounts to no more than the legal conclusion of a plaintiffs 
witness, which is inadmissible to defeat a summary judgment 
motion. [Citations omitted]. ("Unsupported . . . affidavits 
setting forth ultimate or conclusionary facts and conclusions of 
law are insufficient to either support or defeat a motion for 
summary judgment.") [Citations omitted]. A reading of 49 
C.F.R. § 213.9(a) discloses no mention of an "open countryside" 
exception for tracks in urban areas. The Court holds that the 
conclusionary allegations of plaintiff s experts on this issue fail 
to create a genuine issue of material fact sufficient to withstand 
defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
868 F.Supp. at 187. Likewise, here, the FRA regulations [both § 213.9(a) and § 217.7] make 
no mention of a timetable speed limit exception to the maximum speed limits set in 49 C.F.R. 
§ 213.9(a), and plaintiffs expert witnesses cannot be heard to "rule" to the contrary. A 
railroad's "internal policies" regarding train speed, whether they are to abide municipal speed 
ordinances and/or railroad timetable speed limit restrictions, which are inconsistent with the 
preemptive and controlling FRA regulations, are irrelevant and cannot be relied upon to 
create issues of negligence against the Railroad. 
Furthermore, the case of Southern Pacific Trans. Co. Public Utilities Commission of 
Oregon. 9 F.3d 807 (9th Cir. 1993) has specifically ruled that railroad rules filed pursuant 
to § 217.7 do not thereby become federal laws. In that case an Oregon law permitted local 
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authorities to ban the sounding of locomotive whistles under certain conditions. Desiring for 
safety reasons to be able to continue sounding whistles, Southern Pacific argued that the state 
law was preempted by a number of federal regulations, including 49 C.F.R. § 217 which, 
it argued, required federal filing of the railroad's operating rules pertaining to the sounding 
of whistles, thereby raising such rules to the level of federal law. The Ninth Circuit 
disagreed, ruling that although rules are required to be filed with the FRA, "because the FRA 
neither approves nor adopts the railroads1 rules in any manner [only requires they be filed], 
the rules do not have the force of law and therefore cannot preempt the Oregon statute." 9 
F.3d at 81, n. 5. Accordingly, if Southern Pacific's internal operating rules which require the 
sounding of a whistle at railroad crossings and which are required to be filed with the FRA 
under 49 C.F.R. § 217 do not have the "force of law," neither does Union Pacific's timetable 
speed limit in the case at bar. 
2. The Train Was Traveling Within the Timetable Speed Limit 
of 50 m.p.h. 
49 C.F.R. § 229.117 (Addendum C) requires every locomotive operating in excess of 
20 m.p.h. to be equipped with a "speed indicator" accurate within ± 3 m.p.h. at speeds of 
10-30 m.p.h., and accurate within 5 m.p.h. at speeds above 30 m.p.h. These federal 
accuracy standards recognize the inherent variables in locomotive speed indicators referred 
to by Union Pacific's expert witness, George Ohlsson (R.93-90). Such standards preempt 
any argument of excessive speed as long as the speed is within the variables allowed. 
Accordingly, here any speed shown on the speed indicator printout up to and including 55 
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m.p.h. would be an allowable variable under 49 C.F.R. § 229.117. Therefore, not only was 
the train traveling within the controlling federal speed limit of 60 m.p.h., but it was also 
traveling within the timetable limit of 50 m.p.h. as that limit must be interpreted by factoring 
in the 5 m.p.h. variable allowed by § 229.117. To rule otherwise would be to inappropriately 
assume that the speed indicator was precisely accurate when in fact the actual speed may 
have been well below 50 m.p.h. 
n. 
EVEN ASSUMING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE TIMETABLE SPEED 
LIMIT OF 50 M.P.H. WAS THE ENFORCEABLE LIMIT, THE 
TRAIN'S SPEED WAS NOT A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE 
ACCIDENT. 
Even though the trial court agreed, at pp. 9-10 of its Memorandum Decision, that as 
a matter of law Union Pacific's timetable speed limit of 50 m.p.h. did not have the force and 
effect of federal law under 49 C.F.R. § 217, the Court chose to decide the speed issue on the 
basis of proximate cause. 
It is Hornbook Law that excessive speed is judicially significant only where it is the 
proximate cause of the accident; and that an unlawful speed is not causal merely because it 
places a vehicle at a particular place at a particular time-it is only causal where it prevents 
or retards the operator from slowing down, stopping or otherwise controlling the train or 
vehicle so as to avoid the collision; or where it misleads the driver of the other vehicle. 
Blashfield Automobile Law and Practice, Vol. 2, § 105.6, pp. 313-318; Dombeck v. Chicago. 
Milwaukee. St. Paul & Pacific R. Co.. 129 N.W.2d 185 (Wise. 1964); Horsley v. Robinson. 
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186 P.2d 592 (Utah 1947); CTMalley V, Eagan, 2 P.2d 1063 (Wyo. 1931); Whiffin v Union 
Pacific R Co.. 89 P.2d 540 (Idaho 1949). 
Dombeck v. Chicago, Milwaukee. St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., supra, which the trial 
court found directly in point, is decisive of this issue. There, the driver of the automobile 
saw the train at the last minute and tried to accelerate over the crossing in front of the train 
because the road was too slippery to stop. The plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the railroad 
was negligent in allowing its train to travel 25 m.p.h. over the railroad's timetable speed limit 
of 40 m.p.h. In ruling that even 25 m.p.h. over the speed limit could not have been a 
proximate cause of the accident, the Court stated: 
Notwithstanding the evidence as to speed we conclude 
that under the facts of this case, assuming that the speed of the 
train was negligent, such speed as a matter of law could not be 
causal. In order to be causal the train's speed must either have 
misled Richard Dombeck, the driver of the car, or it must have 
interfered with the control and management of the train to the 
extent of rendering it probable that such control and 
management would have otherwise been effective to have 
avoided the collision. The evidence here excludes both of these 
hypotheses. 
Richard's testimony clearly excludes the possibility that 
he was misled as to the speed of the train and that he attempted 
to cross in front of it on reliance that it was traveling at a lesser 
speed than it actually was. 
. . . the reason Richard attempted to cross the track by 
accelerating instead of trying to stop was because he had 
concluded that he could not stop before reaching the track. 
Speed is not causal merely because the train arrived at the 
crossing the instant it did while if it had been going slower the 
car might have safely crossed ahead of it. [Citation omitted]. 
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. . . There is no evidence in the record that the application of the 
emergency brakes at a point 30 feet from the crossing would 
have reduced the train's speed sufficiently to have avoided the 
collision. We think the probabilities are that it would not. In 
any event, a jury should not be permitted to speculate as to this. 
The situation is different with respect to the operation of 
automobiles where it can be assumed that jurors possess some 
knowledge of stopping distances and effectiveness of 
automobile brakes, This is not the situation with respect to the 
operation and stopping of trains, 
Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in 
failing to submit a jury question as to the train's speed since the 
evidence could not support a finding that any such speed was 
causal. 
129 N.W.2d at 192-93 (Emphasis added). Likewise, here, the speed of the train, regardless 
of whether it was 49, 50, 51 or 52 m.p.h., could not possibly have been a proximate cause 
of the accident. There is no dispute that Jensen and Brinkmeier never looked for, listened 
for, saw or heard the train prior to impact-they were both totally oblivious to the presence 
of the train. Therefore, neither could have been mislead as to the speed of the train since 
they had no idea what that speed was. 
Furthermore, Jensen made no argument nor produced any evidence to the effect that 
had the train been traveling 1-2 m.p.h. slower at the time Engineer Puffer activated the 
emergency brakes, it could have been stopped or at least slowed sufficiently to have allowed 
Jensen's automobile to pass safely over the crossing. Indeed, common sense as well as the 
only evidence on the issue is directly to the contraiy. Engineer Puffer at p. 4 of his Affidavit 
(R. 99), testified that a train such as the one he was operating at the time of the accident 
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"takes a number of seconds, after placing it into emergency braking, before it even begins 
to slow down. On this occasion the train did not even begin to slow down before the 
accident happened." George Ohlsson testified at p. 3 of his Affidavit (R. 91), that a small 
difference of a few miles per hour "would not have made any significant difference in terms 
of how far the train would have gone before slowing down or stopping after the brakes were 
applied;" and that "a matter of 1 m.p.h. for a train this long and heavy and traveling at this 
speed is, in my opinion, insignificant in terms of stopping time and distance". Such 
testimony is supported by explanations provided by the Utah Supreme Court in other 
crossing accident cases. For example, in Van Waggoner v. Union Pacific R.. 186 P.2d 293 
(Utah 1947), the Utah Supreme Court explained: 
Because of the weight of trains, the impossibility of stopping within 
short distances, and the impossibility of turning to avoid objects in its path, the 
same right of way rule does not apply as in the case of two automobiles. 
Trains cannot be stopped in time to avoid collisions if the time interval is 
shortened to a matter of.. . seconds 
186 P.2d at 300-301. And in Gregory v. Denver & R.G.W. R.. 329 P.2d 407 (Utah 1958), 
the court said: 
It is contrary to the generally known laws of physics and common sense 
to expect a train, with its great weight and momentum to stop within the short 
distance available after the instant it should have become apparent that 
Gregory was not going to stop. After that point was reached, there is nothing 
a crew could have done to avoid the collision. And this is true whether the 
train was traveling fast or slow and whether the crew saw him or not. 
329 P.2d at 409. 
Jensen erroneously applies a "but for" test in arguing that an allegedly excessive train 
speed of 1-2 m.p.h. imposes liability on Union Pacific. The test is one of proximate cause, 
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not cause in fact. Were it not so, as stated by Prosser, "the consequences of an act [would] 
go forward to eternity, and the causes of an event [would] go back to the discovery of 
America and beyond." Prosser, Law of Torts (4th Ed. 1982), Chap. 7, p. 236. Under the 
circumstances of the accident, the speed of Union Pacificfs train, regardless of whether it was 
49 or 52 m.p.h., was merely a condition of the accident, as was Jensen's getting out of bed 
in the morning, and extremely remote in the change of causation. Therefore, even assuming, 
arguendo, that the enforceable speed limit was the timetable limit of 50 m.p.h., a speed of 
1 or 2 m.p.h. in excess thereof could not have been a proximate cause of the accident as a 
matter of law. 
in. 
JENSEN DID NOT RAISE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT 
CONCERNING WHETHER UNION PACIFIC COMPLIED WITH THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 56-1-14 IN SOUNDING 
THE TRAIN'S WHISTLE AND BELL. 
1. Jensen's Affidavit Is Inconsistent With Her Previous Testimony. 
Jensen's statement in her affidavit, submitted in opposition to Union Pacific's motion, 
that she "did not hear the train blow its whistle or sound its horn anytime prior to the 
collision" is inconsistent with her earlier Answer to Interrogatory No. 26, that she did not 
remember what happened. Since a party may not rely on a subsequent affidavit that 
contradicts prior sworn testimony in order to create an issue of fact, Jensen's affidavit 
testimony that she did not hear the whistle should be disregarded. Webster v. Sill. 675 P.2d 
1170 (Utah 1983); Gawv. State. 798 P.2d 1130 (Utah Ct App. 1990). 
22 
2. Jensen's Statement In Her Affidavit That She Did Not Hear 
The Whistle Is Not Probative Evidence, 
Jensen does not testify in her affidavit that the whistle was not sounded—only that she 
did not hear it. Such a statement is considered "negative" testimony and, without more, is 
not sufficiently probative to raise an issue of fact regarding whether the whistle was blown, 
in the face of the positive testimony set forth in the affidavit of Engineer Puffer that he did, 
in fact, sound the whistle. In order for Jensen's testimony to rise to the level of positive 
testimony sufficient to raise a question of fact, she must lay an appropriate foundation by 
additionally testifying that not only was she in a physical position to hear the whistle, but 
also that she was paying sufficient attention that she would have heard the whistle had it 
been sounded. Hudson v. Union Pacific RH 233 P.2d 357 (Utah 1951); Seabold v. Union 
Pacific RH 239 P.2d 175 (Utah 1951); Bebout v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co.. 982 F.2d 1178 
(7th Cir. 1993). Jensen did not lay that kind of foundation in her affidavit. In view of her 
earlier testimony that she remembered little if anything of the events leading up to the 
accident, and admission that she may have been involved in playing the "wish game" with 
Bruce Brinkmeier, Jensen cannot do so now. The fact that she did not hear any whistle even 
though others did, including independent witnesses, is supportive of the fact that Jensen was 
not paying attention. 
3. Bruce Brinkmeier's Statement Is Not Probative Evidence. 
For the same reasons set forth in paragraph 111.2 above, Bruce Brinkmeier's unsworn 
negative statement that he did not hear the whistle does not raise an issue of fact concerning 
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whether the whistle was blown. As stated at p. 15 of his statement submitted by Jensen 
(R. 164): 
CR-(Claim Representative) Did you hear any trains coming? 
I—(Interviewee) Nope, I didn't hear the train or a horn. 
CR—You weren't paying attention for any train horns, do you 
know or ? 
I—Oh, I'm sure I was subconsciously, but not paying attention. 
CR-Right. 
I-But the people, the witnesses at the auction, said that he was 
blowing his horn from a ways back. 
CR-Right. 
I—But I never heard anything. 
Not only does Brinkmeier admit that he never heard the whistle, but he also admits 
that he was not listening or paying attention. Thus, he impliedly admits that the whistle 
could have been sounded-he just didn't hear it. His statement is negative testimony and 
cannot be changed into positive testimony since he cannot meet the second portion of the 
two-pronged foundational test of paying sufficient attention. 
In any event, Brinkmeier's statement is not in affidavit form and is not, therefore, 
competent to raise an issue of fact in the face of Engineer Puffer's Affidavit that the whistle 
was sounded. It is clear that when a motion for summary judgment is filed and supported 
by Affidavit, the party opposing the motion has an affirmative duty to respond with affidavits 
or other materials allowed by Rule 56(e), U.R.C.P. Brinkmeier's unverified and unsworn 
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statement that he did not hear the whistle should be disregarded. D & L Supply v. Saurini 
775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989). 
4. The Statements Of Gerald and Whitney Hill Are Not 
Probative Evidence That Union Pacific Did Not Comply 
With The Whistle Statute. 
The Hills make no reference to the whistle one way or the other-the subject simply 
was not addressed. A failure to make mention that the whistle was sounded does not provide 
a basis for arguing that it was not If it did, by the same reasoning Union Pacific could argue 
that a failure to mention that the whistle was not sounded gives rise to the implication that 
it was. For obvious reasons, including the fact that the statements are not in affidavit or 
deposition form, the testimony of Gerald and Whitney Hill is not evidence on the issue of 
whether the whistle was blown for the statutory distance or at all. The statements should be 
disregarded on this issue. 
Union Pacific also notes that in mentioning the Hills' failure to say that the whistle 
was sounded, Jensen selectively overlooks the statement from independent eyewitness 
Johnny Starks, which was also attached to the Sheriffs Report, that: "I heard the train honk-
ing". 
5. There Is No Material Variation In Union Pacific's Evidence 
Regarding The Sounding Of The Whistle. 
Jensen's argument that Union Pacific has provided conflicting information regarding 
the sounding of the locomotive whistle is a red herring. Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 
(Addendum D) does not require a particular "sequence" of whistle sounds-only that tl ^ 
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whistle QL the bell be operated "continuously" from one-quarter (1/4) mile away on up to the 
crossing. On its face, this continuous whistle requirement could mean one constant blast for 
the entire distance without any interruption-or it could mean intermittent blasts of one length 
or another "continuously" for the required distance. Statutorily, it does not matter which way 
the engineer chooses to do it as long as he does it for the requisite distance. Accordingly, 
it is irrelevant whether Union Pacific's Answer to Interrogatory No. 10 dated July 22, 1994, 
specified that the whistle was sounded intermittently in a certain sequence of sounds and that 
the Statement of Facts in its Motion for Summary Judgment, based upon Engineer Puffer's 
later Affidavit, specified that the whistle and bell were being operated "continuously" for the 
required distance. Also, Jensen fails to mention that at the same time that Engineer Puffer 
provided his Affidavit, Union Pacific filed Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories dated 
February 3, 1995, which conformed its earlier Answer to Interrogatory No. 10 to Engineer 
Puffer's testimony in his Affidavit. (R. 271-268). Therefore, even if it were relevant, there 
is no inconsistency or variation in Union Pacific's facts regarding the sounding of the whistle. 
6. The Speed Indicator Printout Is Not Evidence That The 
Whistle Was Not Sounded. 
As explained in the attached Supplemental Affidavit of George E. Ohlsson (R. 259-
58), the speed indicator printout fails to show that the whistle was being sounded because 
the design of the 8 track cassette recording device used on the locomotive is of the older type 
which does not have a channel for recording the whistle. Accordingly, the reason why the 
event recorder printout does not show a whistle is not that the whistle was not being 
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sounded. It was because the recorder was not designed or installed on the locomotive to do 
so. Jensen adduced no evidence to the contrary. Therefore, the event recorder printout is 
irrelevant on the issue of whether the whistle was sounded. 
IV. 
THE CONDITION OF THE CROSSING AT THE TIME OF THE 
ACCIDENT DID NOT IMPOSE ADDITIONAL DUTIES OF CARE ON 
UNION PACIFIC. 
1. There Is No Probative Evidence That The Crossing Was 
More Than Ordinarily Hazardous. 
Jensen's only basis for arguing a more than ordinarily hazardous crossing is her 
belated affidavit testimony that the auction held at the Utah Livestock Auction premises 
located in the southwest quadrant of the crossing intersection, which is on the opposite side 
of the tracks from which Jensen's automobile approached, brought additional traffic 
congestion and noise to the area sufficient to obstruct the view of the approaching train and 
obscure or muffle the warning sounds of the train's approach. Other than the contradictory 
testimony contained in her affidavit, Jensen has not presented even a scintilla of evidence to 
the effect that such obstructions were present or that they made the crossing more than 
ordinarily hazardous. 
While Jensen now testifies by affidavit that "I noticed that there were a lot of trucks 
and trailers which obstructed our view of the tracks in all directions/' in earlier answers to 
interrogatories Jensen specifically testified that she did not remember whether the view at 
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the crossing was obstructed. Union Pacific's Interrogatories Nos. 25 and 26 and Jensen's 
Answers thereto state as follows: 
25. Describe in detail any and all obstructions to your vision of the 
train's approach and railroad crossing where the accident occurred at 
the time of the accident. 
Answer: I do not recall if the view was obstructed. 
26. State in detail your version of how the accident occurred. 
Answer: I remember nothing of the accident and very little, if 
anything, of what happened prior to the accident. 
As explained in paragraph 111.1 above, for purposes of defeating a motion for summary 
judgment Jensen is not allowed to change previously sworn testimony in order to create an 
issue of fact. Jensen's affidavit testimony that the train's approach was obstructed should be 
disregarded. 
Furthermore, there is no probative evidence regarding obstruction to view and no 
evidence whatsoever, either in affidavit form or otherwise, that the auction noise obscured 
the sound of the warning devices on the train. Accordingly, in the face of the photographs 
attached to the Curley Affidavit (R. 113-110), which speak for themselves, Jensen's bare 
allegation that the crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous does not create an issue of 
fact for jury consideration as a matter of law. Duncan v. Union Pacific R. Co., 790 P.2d 595 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990), affii, 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992). 
2. The Law Imposes No Additional Duty On Union Pacific 
Because Of The Nature Of The Crossing. 
Jensen misstates the duty of care Utah law imposes on railroads where crossings are 
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or may be determined to be more than ordinarily hazardous. Initially, because all railroad 
crossings are by their very nature inherently dangerous, a railroad cannot be held liable for 
crossing conditions unless the crossing is more than ordinarily hazardous. Id. Where a 
crossing is or may be deemed to be extrahazardous, a railroad's duty of care may be 
increased thereby but is still limited to those unsafe conditions which it created or over which 
it has responsibility. Thus, obstructions caused or created by the railroad or located on 
railroad right of way may be the railroad's responsibility to abate. Gleave v. Denver & Rio 
Grande Western R.R.. 749 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Duncan, supra. However, 
adjacent property owners have responsibility to remove vegetation or other obstructions on 
their property which constitute a "traffic hazard" (Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-19); and UDOT 
has been delegated the responsibihty for regulating the safe travel of motorists on roads and 
highways, including those which pass over and across railroad tracks. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 54-4-14 et sea.; Duncan, supra. 
It is not enough for Jensen to simply allege that the crossing was more than ordinarily 
hazardous. She must also allege and prove the specific duty of care that was breached by 
Union Pacific, such as the "wild vegetation" the Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad 
allowed to grow on its right of way and which obstructed the motorist's view in Gleave. 
supra. 
Here Jensen makes the bare allegation of an extrahazardous crossing but fails to allege 
how Union Pacific was negligent with respect to such condition. Under Duncan. Union 
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Pacific had no duty to signalize the crossing. Under Easterwood Union Pacific had no duty 
to reduce its speed (even though it did) below the federal limit. And obviously, Union 
Pacific was not responsible for any problems that may have been caused by the livestock 
auction which was located entirely off the right of way. As stated in Duncan: 
Plaintiff has failed to "demonstrate, or even suggest what more 
Union Pacific could [legally] have done to make this crossing 
safer, short of installing automatic warning lights and gates, 
which admittedly was not its responsibility. 
842 P.2d at 833-34. The trial court was correct in ruling as a matter of law that Union 
Pacific breached no duty of care owed to the Jensen concerning the alleged unsafe nature of 
the crossing. 
CONCLUSION 
As a matter of law the federally set speed limit for the train and trackage where the 
crossing is located was 60 m.p.h. and there is no factual dispute that Union Pacific's train 
was traveling substantially under that limit. In any event, the train's speed as alleged by 
Jensen could not have been a proximate cause of the accident. There is no probative 
evidence that the train whistle and bell were not sounded as prescribed by the statute. There 
is no probative evidence that the crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous or even 
assuming that it was, that Union Pacific breached any duty of care owed to Jensen with 
respect to such alleged condition. Union Pacific submits that the undisputed probative facts 
and the applicable law show as a matter of law that the accident was not caused by any 
negligence on Union Pacific's part, and that the trial court was correct in granting the 
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Railroad's Motion. 
DATED this 18th day of January, 1996. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 18th day of January, 1996, a copy of the foregoing was 
served in the manner indicated below upon the following: 
Allen K. Young, Esq. 
Young & Kester 
101 East 200 South 
Springville, Utah 84663 
U.S. Mail 
Hand Delivered 
Overnight 
Facsimile 
No Service 
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ADDENDUM 
ADDENDUM A 
49 CFR Ch. II (10-1-94 Edition) 
Federal Railroad Administration, DOT 
§213.9 Classes of 
speed limits. 
track: operating 
(a) Except as provided in paragraphs 
(b) and (c) of this section and 
§§ 213.57(b), 213.59(a), 213.113(a), and 
213.137 (b) and (c), the following maxi-
mum allowable operating speeds apply: 
[In miles per hour] 
Over track that meets all of the re-
quirements prescribed in 
Class 1 track 
Class 2 track 
Class 3 track 
Class 4 track 
Class 5 track 
Class 6 track 
for-
tius part 
The maxi-
mum al-
lowable 
operating 
speed for 
freight 
trains is— 
10 
25 
40 
60 
80 
110 
The maxi-
mum al-
lowable 
operating 
speed for 
passenger 
trains is— 
15 
30 
60 
80 
90 
110 
(b) If a segment of track does not 
meet all of the requirements for its in-
tended class, it is reclassified to the 
next lowest class of track for which it 
does meet all of the requirements of 
this part. However, if the segment of 
track does not at least meet the re-
quirements for Class 1 track, oper-
ations may continue at Class 1 speeds 
for a period of not more than 30 days 
without bringing the track into com-
pliance, under the authority of a per-
son designated under § 213.7(a), who has 
at least one year of supervisory experi-
ence in railroad track maintenance, 
after that person determines that oper-
ations may safely continue and subject 
to any limiting conditions specified by 
such person. 
(c) Maximum operating speed may 
not exceed 110 m.p.h. without prior ap-
proval of the Federal Railroad Admin-
istrator. Petitions for approval must be 
filed in the manner and contain the in-
formation required by §211.11 of this 
chapter. Each petition must provide 
sufficient information concerning the 
performance characteristics of the 
track, signaling, grade crossing protec-
tion, trespasser control where appro-
priate, and equipment involved and 
also concerning maintenance and in-
spection practices and procedures to be 
followed, to establish that the proposed 
speed can be sustained in safety. 
[36 FR 20336. Oct. 20, 1971, as amended at 38 
FR 875, Jan. 5, 1973; 38 FR 23405, Aug. 30, 1973; 
47 FR 39402, Sept. 7. 1982; 48 FR 35883, Aug. 8, 
1983] 
ADDENDUM B 
49 CFR Ch. II (10-1-94 Edition) 
§ 217.7 Operating rules; filing and rec-
ordkeeping. 
(a) On or before December 21, 1994, 
each Class I railroad, Class II railroad, 
the National Railroad Passenger Cor-
porat ion, and each railroad providing 
commuter service in a metropoli tan or 
suburban area t h a t is in operation on 
November 21, 1994, shall file with the 
Federal Railroad Administrator , Wash-
ington, DC 20590, one copy of i ts code of 
operat ing rules, t imetables, and t ime-
table special ins t ruct ions which were 
in effect on November 21, 1994. Each 
Class I railroad, each Class n railroad, 
and each railroad providing commuter 
service in a metropol i tan or suburban 
area t h a t commences operations after 
November 21, 1994, shall file with the 
Adminis t ra tor one copy of i ts code of 
operating rules, t imetables, and t ime-
table special instructions before i t 
commences operations. 
(b) After November 21, 1994, each 
Class I rai lroad, each Class II railroad, 
the National Railroad Passenger Cor-
poration, and each railroad providing 
commuter service in a metropoli tan or 
suburban area shall file each new 
amendment to i ts code of operating 
rules, each new timetable, and each 
new t imetable special instruct ion with 
the Federal Railroad Administrator 
within 30 days after i t is issued. 
(c) On or after November 21, 1994, 
each Class m railroad and any other 
railroad subject to this par t but not 
subject to paragraphs (a) and (b) of this 
section shall keep one copy of i ts cur-
rent code of operating rules, t ime-
tables, and t imetable special instruc-
tions and one copy of each subsequent 
amendment to i ts code of operating 
rules, each new t imetable, and each 
new t imetable special instruction, a t 
i ts system headquarters, and shall 
make such records available to rep-
resentat ives of the Federal Railroad 
Administrat ion for inspection and 
copying during normal business hours. 
[59 FR 43070, Aug. 22, 1994] 
EFFECTIVE DATE NOTE: At 59 FR 43070, Aug. 
22, 1994, §217.7 was revised effective Novem-
ber 21, 1994. For the convenience of the user, 
the superseded text is set forth below. 
J 217-7 Filing of operating rules. 
(a) Before February 1, 1975, each railroad 
that is in operation on January 1, 1975, shall 
file with the Federal Railroad Adminis-
trator, Washington, DC 20590, one copy of its 
code of operating rules, timetables, and 
timetable special instructions which were in 
effect on January 1, 1975. Each railroad that 
commences operation after January 1, 1975, 
shall file with the Administrator one copy of 
its code of operating rules, timetables, and 
timetable instructions before it commences 
operations. 
(b) Each amendment to a railroad's code of 
operating rules, each new timetable, and 
each new timetable special instruction 
which is issued after January 1, 1975, shall be 
filed with the Federal Railroad Adminis-
trator within 30 days after it is issued. 
ADDENDUM C 
49 CFR.Ch. II (10-1-94 Edition) 
§229-117 Speed indicators. 
(a) After December 31t 1980, each lo-
comotive used as a controlling loco-
motive at speeds in excess of 20 miles 
per hour shall be equipped with a speed 
indicator which is— 
(1) Accurate within ±3 miles per hour 
of actual speed at speeds of 10 to 30 
miles per hour and accurate within ±5 
miles per hour at speeds above 30 miles 
per hour; and 
(2) Clearly readable from the engi-
neer's normal position under all light 
conditions. 
(b) Each speed indicator required 
shall be tested as soon as possible after 
departure by means of speed test sec-
tions or equivalent procedures. 
ADDENDUM D 
56-1-14 RAILROADS 
56-1-14. Procedures at grade crossings. 
Every locomotive shall be provided with a bell which shall be rung contin-
uously from a point not less than eighty rods from any city or town street or 
public highway grade crossing until such city or town street or public highway 
grade crossing shall be crossed, but, except in towns and at terminal points, the 
sounding of the locomotive whistle or siren at least one-fourth of a mile before 
reaching any such grade crossing shall be deemed equivalent to ringing the 
bell as aforesaid; during the prevalence of fogs, snow and dust storms, the 
locomotive whistle shall be sounded before each street crossing while passing 
through cities and towns. All locomotives with or without trains before crossing 
the main track at grade of any other railroad must come to a full stop at a 
distance not exceeding 400 feet from the crossing, and must not proceed until 
the way is known to be clear; two blasts of the whistle or two sounds of the 
siren shall be sounded at the moment of starting; provided, that whenever 
interlocking signal apparatus and derailing switches or any other crossing 
protective device approved by the Department of Transportation is adopted 
such stop shall not be required. 
Provided, that local authorities in their respective jurisdiction may by 
ordinance approved by the Department of Transportation provide more re-
stricted sounding of bells or whistles or sirens than is provided herein and may 
prescribe points different from those herein set forth at which such signals 
shall be given and may further restrict such ringing of bells or sounding of 
whistles or sirens so as to provide for either the ringing of a bell or the 
sounding of a whistle or of a siren or the elimination of the sounding of such 
bells or whistles or sirens or either of them, except in case of emergency. 
The term locomotive as used herein shall mean every self-propelled steam 
engine, electrically propelled interurban car and so-called diesel operated 
locomotive. 
Every person in charge of a locomotive violating the provisions of this section 
is guilty of a misdemeanor, and the railroad company shall be liable for all 
damages which any person may sustain by reason of such violation. 
ADDENDUM E 
J. CLARE WILLIAMS, #3490 
MORRIS O HAGGERTY, #5283 
Attorneys for Defendant 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY 
406 West 100 South 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101-1151 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ALECIA JENSEN, ) 
) ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs, ) 
vs. ) 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD ) 
COMPANY ) Civil No. 940400280 
Defendant. ) Judge Boyd L. Park 
Defendant, Union Pacific Railroad Company's Motion for Summary Judgment came on for 
hearing by the Court on April 17, 1995; with defendant being represented by J. Clare Williams 
and plaintiff, who was present in the courtroom, being represented by Allen K. Young; and with 
the parties having filed written briefs and exhibits and having argued their respective positions to 
the Court, and the Court being fully advised in the premises, now rules as follows: 
The Court finds and concludes: 
(1) That the speed of defendant's train was not a proximate cause of the 
accident; 
(2) That defendant was not responsible for any conditions which may have 
been present at the time of the accident and created a "more than ordinarily hazardous" 
crossing; and 
(3) That defendant did sound the train's bell and whistle as it approached the 
crossing. 
Therefore, the Court finds that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact to prevent 
it from acting on defendant's motion as a matter of law. 
Accordingly, the Court hereby grants defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and 
orders plaintiffs Complaint dismissed w t^h prejudice, with each party to pay its own costs and 
expenses. 
DATED this _ ^ _ day of June, 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
JDG£~BOYDK PARK 
Approved as to form this day 
of , 1995. 
Allen K. Young 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ADDENDUM F 
Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ALECIA JENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD, INC., 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 940400280 
DATE May 15, 1995 
JUDGE BOYD L. PARK 
This matter came before the Court on April 17, 1995 for oral argument on 
defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment. The Court, having received and reviewed the 
motion, memorandum in support, memorandum in opposition, reply memorandum, and 
supplemental reply memorandum; having heard oral arguments; and having reviewed the 
applicable law, now makes the following findings and conclusions: 
1. This Court has jurisdiction to decide this case. Although plaintiff is a resident of 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, defendant Union Pacific Railroad is a Utah corporation 
authorized to do business in the State of Utah and in Utah County, State of Utah. The 
accident which gave rise to this cause of action occurred in Utah County, State of Utah, and 
therefore jurisdiction and venue are properly vested in this Court. 
2. On February 5, 1994, the parties were involved in a collision between defendant's 
train and plaintiffs automobile. Plaintiff was a passenger in her automobile, which was 
crossing the railroad tracks at approximately 5950 South 650 West in Utah County when the 
automobile was struck by a train owned and operated by defendant. Plaintiff alleges she 
suffered severe and permanent injuries as a direct and proximate result of this collision. 
3. On February 7, 1995 defendant filed with this Court a Motion For Summary 
Judgment and an accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion 
For Summary Judgment. On March 2, 1995 plaintiff filed a Memorandum in Opposition to 
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Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment and a Request for Hearing on Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment. On March 15, 
1995 Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment was 
filed. On April 12, 1995 Defendant's Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of 
Motion For Summary Judgment was filed with the Court. Oral arguments on this motion 
were heard on April 17, 1995. 
4. The accident giving rise to this cause of action occurred at approximately 12:10 
p.m. on February 5, 1994 at a public railroad crossing of defendant's Provo Subdivision 
mainline trackage located near 650 West and 5950 South in Spanish Fork, Utah County. At 
the time of the accident, plaintiffs automobile was being driven by plaintiffs boyfriend, 
Brace Brinkmeier, also a minor at the time of the accident. Brinkmeier was cited for driving 
without a license. The train in question was an empty coal train with three locomotives and 
46 trailing empty coal cars. The train weighed 1424 tons and was 2622 feet in length. 
5. According to the train's engineer, the train was traveling from Milford to Provo in 
a southwest to northeast direction. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, defendant's Memorandum 
in Support, Exhibit D. The trackage at that location is relatively straight and flat. See 
Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at % 5(e). 
Plaintiffs automobile was traveling southbound on 650 West. The road (650 West) is 
straight and flat for hundreds of feet before reaching the crossing. Id. The trackage and 
road intersect at an angle greater than 90 degrees with reference to the directions of approach 
of the train and car. Id. at % 5(a). 
6. The crossing is located in a rural fanning area and is surrounded by open fields on 
the approach side. A Utah Livestock Auction building and animal pens are located in the 
southwest quadrant of the crossing intersection, which is on the opposite side of the tracks 
from which plaintiffs automobile approached. The northwest quadrant, which is the view 
quadrant for the approaching train and car, is an open field. See Affidavit of Lawrence 
Curley, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B. At the time of the accident, a 
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livestock auction was taking place. There was a considerable amount of traffic, and trucks 
and trailers were parked near the crossing. 
7. An advance stop sign warning sign was posted alongside 650 West approximately 
572 feet north of the crossing. Also posted were an advance railroad crossing warning sign, 
an advance railroad crossing sign painted on the road, railroad crossing "crossbuck" signs, 
and a stop sign. See Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's Memorandum in Support, 
Exhibit B. 
8. Defendant alleges that its engineer began sounding the locomotive whistle and bell 
approximately 1/4 mile away from the 5950 South crossing and continued to sound them up 
to the point of the accident at the 650 West crossing. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, ]% 7-8, 
defendant's Memorandum m Support, Exhibit D. The distance between the 5950 South and 
650 West crossings is approximately 1,100 feet. See Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, 
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at 1 5(b). 
9. At about the time the train passed over the 5950 South crossing, the engineer 
noticed a truck pulling a horse trailer begin to drive over the tracks in a southbound 
direction. Shortly after seeing the truck/horse trailer clear the crossing, the engineer noticed 
plaintiffs automobile rolling towards the crossing. The car was following a few seconds 
behind the truck/horse trailer and moving past the stop sign. The engineer placed the train in 
emergency braking immediately upon seeing the car. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, f^f 9-
11, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D. 
10. The train was a few hundred feet from the crossing when the engineer first saw 
plaintiff's car approaching the intersection. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, f 10, defendant's 
Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D. It took the train approximately 1,400 feet to stop after 
emergency braking was initiated. See Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's 
Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at f 5(g). The left side of the snowplow of the leading 
locomotive struck the right front portion of the car. See Affidavit of Ryan Puffer, f 10, 
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D; Affidavit of Lawrence Curley, defendant's 
Memorandum Decision 940400280 T-
Memorandum in Support, Exhibit B, at f 4(g)-(h). Both occupants were ejected from the car 
and thrown in the same northeasterly direction. Neither occupant was wearing a seatbelt. 
11. Defendant alleges that plaintiff and Brinkmeier played a "wish" game upon arrival 
at the crossing, lifting their feet from the floor of the car and looking for something metallic 
within the car to touch with their fingers while simultaneously making a wish and crossing 
the tracks. Plaintiff admits this, but asserts that she has no recollection of doing so just prior 
to the collision. The parties agree, for the purpose of the summary judgment motion, that 
plaintiff and Brinkmeier never saw or heard the train prior to impact. 
12. The parties agree that the "authorized speed limit" for the trackage in question was 
set by the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) at 60 m.p.h. for freight trains and 80 
m.p.h. for passenger trains. However, defendant Union Pacific voluntarily filed with the 
FRA a lower "timetable" speed of only 50 m.p.h. for its freight trains. Plaintiff argues that 
it is this timetable speed that applies rather than the FRA's authorized speed limit of 60 
m.p.h. 
13. Defendant claims that the train was traveling between 49 and 51 m.p.h. for at least 
the last three miles before the engineer initiated emergency braking. See Affidavit of Ryan 
Puffer, t 5, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D; Affidavit of George E. 
Ohlsson, If 7, defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit F. Plaintiff argues that the train 
was traveling an average speed of 51.5 m.p.h. for the three minutes prior to the collision. 
See Affidavit of Dennis Andrews, 1 8, Plaintiffs Memorandum m Opposition, Exhibit 2. 
14. Summary judgment is appropriate only when no genuine issue of material fact 
exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See U.R.C.P. 56; 
Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon County, 805 P.2d 789 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Furthermore, "[ajlthough summary judgment may on occasion be appropriate in negligence 
cases, it is appropriate only in the most clear-cut case." Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 
126, 126 (1987) (citing Bowen v. Riverton City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982)). 
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15. Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment addresses three areas of analysis: 1) 
Union Pacific was not negligent in traveling in excess of the timetable speed limit; 2) Union 
Pacific did not fail to reduce the speed of its train through what plaintiff alleged to be a 
"more than ordinarily hazardous crossing"; and 3) Union Pacific complied with requirements 
of U.C.A. § 56-1-14, which governs the use of whistles and bells when approaching railroad 
crossings. The Court will analyze these issues individually. 
Authorized Speed Limit 
16. Although the FRA has set the speed limit for freight trains at 60 m.p.h., Union 
Pacific has voluntarily chosen to set a lower "timetable" speed limit of 50 m.p.h. for its 
freight trains, 10 m.p.h. below the speed limit mandated by the FRA. According to 
plaintiffs accident reconstructionist, the train was averaging a speed of 51.5 m.p.h. for the 
three minutes prior to the collision. See Affidavit of Dennis Andrews (Plaintiff's 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibit 2). At 
oral arguments, plaintiff presented a speed graph obtained from the train's recorder. That 
graph indicated variations in the train's speed prior to the accident, and recorded the train's 
speed as varying from 50 m.p.h. to as much as 52.5 m.p.h. 
17. Based on data retrieved from the train's Pulse Electronics "speed recorder" device 
which electronically recorded the train's speed on tape prior to the accident, defendant claims 
that the train was traveling between 49 and 51 m.p.h. for at least the last three miles before 
emergency braking was initiated. See Affidavit of George Ohlsson (defendant's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment, 
Exhibit F); see also Pulse Electronic printout (defendant's Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Motion For Summary Judgment, Exhibit A). In the Affidavit of 
George E. Ohlsson, Manager of Operating Practices for Union Pacific Railroad (see 
defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit F), Mr. Ohlsson stated the following: 
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It is difficult for even the most competent engineer to maintain a long and 
heavy train at a certain and undeviating speed. The curvature and 
undulation of the trackage will retard and increase the speed of a long and 
heavy train even though an engineer is holding a steady throttle on the 
locomotive. A train which travels for a number of miles at a speed which 
does not deviate more than one or two miles an hour is, in my 
professional opinion, going at a steady speed. It is simply not possible to 
control a train's speed any better than that. 
Id. at 1 8. 
18. Defendant argues that the FRA's "authorized speed limit" of 60 m.p.h. for freight 
trains preempts plaintiffs claim of excessive speed. Defendant cites CSX Transportation, 
Inc. v. Easterwood, 113 S.Ct. 1732 (1993) in support of its argument that plaintiffs claims 
of common law negligence are unfounded. In Easterwood. the plaintiff sued for the death of 
her husband resulting from a railroad crossing accident, alleging that CSX was negligent 
under Georgia law for failing to maintain adequate warning devices at the crossing and for 
operating the train at an excessive speed. The authorized speed limit for the track in 
Easterwood was set at 60 m.p.h. and, while conceding that the train was traveling at a speed 
under 60 m.p.h., Easterwood nevertheless claimed that CSX breached its common-law duty 
to operate its train at a moderate and safe rate of speed. 
19. The federal regulations mvolved in Easterwood had been issued by the Secretary of 
Transportation pursuant to the Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA), which 
established an authorized speed limit of 60 m.p.h. for freight trains. A clause of the FRSA 
permits states to adopt or continue in force any state law, rule, regulation, order, or standard 
relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary adopted a regulation covering the 
subject matter of such state requirement. The preemption clause of the FRSA (45 U.S.C.S. 
§ 434) confers on the Secretary of Transportation the power to preempt state common law. 
Given the Secretary's adoption of train-speed regulations pursuant to the FRSA (49 C.F.R. § 
213.9(a)), a state's common-law restrictions on train speed are not preserved by a saving 
clause in 45 U.S.C.S. § 434, under which a state may continue in force an additional or 
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more stringent law relating to railroad safety when necessary to eliminate or reduce an 
essentially local safety hazard and when not incompatible with any federal law. Easterwood, 
113 S.Ct. at 1743 (1993). 
20. The Court in Easterwood found for CSX, who had argued that Easterwood's claim 
was preempted because the federal speed limits are regulations covering the subject matter of 
the common law of train speeds. The Court further stated that to hold otherwise would be to 
deprive the Secretary of the power to preempt state common law, a power clearly conferred 
by § 434. Therefore, the Court found that Easterwood's reliance on the common law was 
incompatible with both the FRSA and the Secretary's regulations. Id. at 1743. 
21. In the case now before this Court, defendant argues that its train was traveling well 
below the federally imposed speed limit of 60 m.p.h. for freight trains. "The fact that the 
Union Pacific had set a lower 'timetable' speed limit than that specified by the FRA is 
irrelevant since any claim based upon a violation of the railroad set limit would be but a 
variation of plaintiffs common law negligence claim of excessive or unreasonable speed." 
See Defendant's Memorandum in Support at 8, f 1. 
22. Plaintiff argues that, because defendant filed its timetable with the FRA pursuant to 
49 C.F.R. 217, the Court should consider that action as evidence that the maximum 
authorized speed at the intersection of the collision is 50 m.p.h. and that timetables filed with 
the FRA are therefore enforceable against the defendant, and train speeds in excess of those 
timetables violate federal law. See Affidavit of Bruce Reading (plaintiffs Memorandum in 
Opposition, Exhibit 1). Furthermore, plaintiff claims that this case is distinguishable from 
Easterwood because there is no attempt to impose on Union Pacific a state-enforced speed 
regulation which is more stringent than its federal counterpart. Instead, plaintiff claims that 
defendant's train was exceeding its own maximum authorized timetable speed, thus violating 
federal law, and that defendant was therefore negligent. 
23. Given the ruling in Easterwood and the parties' arguments, the issue now before the 
Court is (a) whether Union Pacific's timetable speed of 50 m.p.h. for freight trains is a 
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variation of plaintiffs common law negligence claim of excessive speed and thus preempted 
by federal law governing the "subject area," or (b) whether the FRSA covers speed limits 
self-imposed by Union Pacific and, if not, whether defendant was negligent in exceeding its 
speed limit for freight trains. 
24. The FRSA specifically permits states to adopt or continue in force any state law, 
rule, regulation, order, or standard-relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secretary 
adopts a regulation covering the subject matter of such state requirement. This legislation 
was designed to prevent states from interfering with regulations established by the FRA. In 
this case, it is clear that the FRA had designated an "authorized speed limit" of 60 m.p.h. 
for freight trains traveling along this stretch of track. However, the State of Utah has not 
attempted to impose a more stringent law, rule, or regulation regarding authorized train 
speed. Instead, Union Pacific has created its own timetable speed of 50 m.p.h. The Court 
finds the present case to be distinguishable from Easterwood, where the State of Georgia 
tried to impose law, rules, or regulations governing train speed. The Court in Easterwood 
did not explain how the FRSA addresses the question of timetable speeds which are a) self-
imposed by railroad companies and not by States; and b) lower than the federally authorized 
train speeds. 
25. In his affidavit, plaintiffs witness Bruce Reading alleges that, under federal law, 
each railroad company is required to file a copy of its Operating Rules and Timetables with 
the FRA, and concludes that the speed limits mandated in the Union Pacific Railroad 
Company Operating Rules and Timetables thus become the federally mandated guidelines and 
maximum speed limits for the railroad company and are enforceable by the FRA. See 
Affidavit of Bruce Reading, %% 4-9, Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 1. 
Accordingly, Union Pacific's self-imposed timetable speed of 50 m.p.h. would become its 
federally authorized speed and could not be preempted by the FRA. 
26. Defendant argues that 49 C.F.R. § 217 does not authorize timetables to change the 
federal speed limits set in 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 and that timetable filings therefore have no 
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effect on the maximum speeds at which a railroad may operate its trains. According to 
defendant, section 217 requires only the filing of operating rules and timetables, which may 
or may not contain speed limits, and does not require that speed limit changes be filed with 
the FRA. Defendant again turns to the Easterwood decision and argues that it is § 213.9 
which sets the "ceiling" or "maximum" speed, not timetables, and asserts that "[i]mplicit in 
such holding is the understanding that while a railroad may not exceed such limit, it may by 
internal fiat voluntarily operate its trains at any slower speed deemed appropriate." See 
Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support at 4. 
27. The Easterwood case does not provide any clear rule as to how one should address 
the issue of timetable speeds within 49 C.F.R. §§ 217 and 213.9. However, plaintiff has 
equally failed to provide any case law which would substantiate her claim that Union 
Pacific's timetable filing under § 217 has an effect on the maximum speed at which a 
railroad may operate its train under § 213.9. Defendant has provided the Court with the 
recent case of Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Oregon, 9 F.3d 807 
(9th Cir. 1993), which supports defendant's argument that the FRA, by requiring Union 
Pacific to file its timetable speed limits, does not thereby adopt that timetable limit as a 
federal law enforceable against the railroad and preemptive of the speed limits set forth in 49 
C.F.R. §213.9. In Southern Pacific, an Oregon law permitted local authorities to ban the 
sounding of locomotive whistles under certain conditions. Southern Pacific Transportation 
Company argued that the state law was preempted by three federal statutes and moved for 
summary judgment. The state of Oregon made a cross-motion for summary judgment, 
claiming that its regulations were not preempted as a matter of law. Following the Supreme 
Court's decision in Easterwood, the circuit court held that the state law and regulations were 
not preempted by any of the three federal statutes cited by Southern Pacific and affirmed the 
district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of the State of Oregon. 
28. In addressing Southern Pacific's claim that the Oregon statute was also preempted 
by 45 C.F.R. § 217, which requires railroads to keep their operating rules on file with the 
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FRA, the circuit court stated that "[b]ecause the FRA neither approves nor adopts the 
railroad's rules in any manner, the rules do not have the force of law and therefore cannot 
preempt die Oregon statute." Southern Pacific, 9.F3d at 812 n.5. This statement is equally 
applicable in the case now before this Court, in that it supports defendant's argument that 49 
C.F.R. § 217 does not authorize timetables to change the federal speed limits set in 49 
C.F.R. § 213.9. The railroad's rules and timetable filings submitted to the FRA in 
accordance with section 217 are not approved or adopted by the FRA and therefore do not 
have the force of law. 
29. Even if defendant were bound by its timetable speed of 50 m.p.h., there still 
remain the questions of (a) whether Union Pacific was negligent in exceeding that speed, and 
(b) if the train's speed was a proximate cause of the collision. 
30. The train's speed in this matter was not a causal factor unless the train could have 
stopped, prior to collision, from the point at which plaintiff first saw the danger. The Court 
agrees with the holding in Dombeck v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R. Co., 129 
N.W.2d 185 (Wise. 1964). In that case, the Wisconsin Supreme Court determined that, even 
under an assumption that the train's speed was negligent, such speed as a matter of law could 
not be causal: 
In order to be causal the train's speed must either have misled . . . the 
driver of the car or it must have interfered with the control and 
management of the train to the extent of rendering it probable that such 
control and management would have otherwise been effective to have 
avoided the collision. 
Id. at 192. As to the first prong of this test, whether Brinkmeier, as driver, or plaintiff, as 
passenger, were misled as to the speed of the train, plaintiff stated in her affidavit that she 
did not see the train prior to the collision, nor did she hear the train blow its whistle or 
sound its horn prior to the collision. See Affidavit of Alicia Jensen, ^ 7-8, Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 3. In his recorded statement, Mr. Brinkmeier also 
stated that he did not hear the train or its horn. See the recorded statement of Bruce 
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Brinkmeier at 15, Plaintiff's Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 4. The Court finds that, 
because both plaintiff and Brinkmeier admit that they were not looking or listening for a 
train, and because both stated that they never saw or heard the train prior to impact, neither 
could have been misled as to the speed of the train in estimating its time of arrival at the 
crossing. As to the second prong of this test, whether the train's speed interfered with the 
control and management of the train to the extent of rendering it probable that such control 
and management would have otherwise been effective to have avoided the collision, the 
Court finds that plaintiff has made no argument or produced any evidence that the train could 
have been stopped or sufficiently slowed to have allowed plaintiffs automobile to safely 
cross the tracks if the train had indeed been traveling 50 m.p.h. at the time the engineer 
activated the emergency brakes. Defendant, however, provided the Court with the Affidavit 
of Ryan Puffer, the engineer. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit D. In his 
affidavit, Engineer Puffer stated that he placed the train into emergency braking as soon as 
he saw plaintiffs automobile, because it was his impression that the car was not going to 
stop and was going to come onto the track directly in front of the train. He further stated 
that "[a] long heavy train takes a number of seconds, after placing it into emergency braking, 
before it even begins to slow down. On this occasion the train did not even begin to slow 
down before the accident happened." Id. at ^ 11. In addition, defendant provided the Court 
with the affidavit of George E. Ohlsson, Manager of Operating Practices for Union Pacific 
Railroad Company. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit F. In his affidavit, 
Mr. Ohlsson stated that the small difference between the 50 m.p.h. timetable speed and an 
actual speed of approximately 51 m.p.h. "would not have made any significant difference in 
terms of how far the train would have gone before slowing down or stopping after the brakes 
were applied. A matter of 1 m.p.h. is, in my opinion, insignificant in terms of stopping time 
and distance." Id. at ^10. 
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31. For these reasons, the Court finds that, even if the train had been traveling one or 
two miles above the timetable speed limit of 50 m.p.h., the train's speed was not a 
proximate cause of the accident. 
Dangerous Crossing 
32. According to the Utah Supreme court in English v. Southern Pacific Co., 45 P.47 
(1896), a crossing that is "more than ordinarily hazardous" places an additional duty of care 
on the railroad. Plaintiff argues that several conditions existed at the time of the accident 
which created a "more than ordinarily hazardous" crossing. These conditions include (a) an 
auction barn near the tracks accompanied by the busy nature of a livestock auction; and (b) 
trucks and trailers parked near the crossing which may have impeded vision or caused 
plaintiff to not hear the train as it approached. According to plaintiff, the accident occurred 
during a time when the commotion and noise of a livestock auction rendered the nearby 
crossing "more than ordinarily hazardous." 
33. More recently, the Utah Court of Appeals applied the English standard of "more 
than ordinarily hazardous" in Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. Co., 749 P.2d 
660 (Utah App. 1988). In Gleave, the plaintiff was hit by an empty coal train at a crossing 
in Springville. Utah. The court instructed the jury that "UDOT was statutorily given 
ultimate responsibility for crossing design and warning and safety devices and that, 
accordingly, [the jury] could not find Rio Grande negligent 'based upon any defects which 
might exist with respect to the design of the 1600 South crossing or based upon any problems 
you may perceive in the lack of traffic warning devices' there." Id. at 663. The jury found 
the crossing to be more than ordinarily hazardous and then further found that Rio Grande 
failed to exercise reasonable care in driving the train across the roadway "given the 
crossing's design, its physical characteristics, and the existing warning signs." Id. at 664. 
The conditions that contributed to this "hazardous" crossing in Gleave included a dangerous 
crossing angle, a mound of earth, and a curving track. 
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34. In Duncan v. Union Pacific R.R., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1992), a car containing a 
driver and three passengers was struck by a freight train in Tooele County on Droubay Road. 
While the road intersected the track at 43 degrees on the north and 136 degrees on the south, 
nothing obstructed the motorist's view of the tracks for several thousand feet. The Utah 
Supreme court in Duncan affirmed the trial court's finding that the "crossing was not 'more 
than ordinarily hazardous' because plaintiffs could not demonstrate, or even suggest, what 
more Union Pacific could have done to make this crossing safer, short of installing automatic 
warning lights and signs and gates, which admittedly was not its responsibility." Id, at 833. 
However, the Duncan court did reiterate the criteria used in the English case to determine 
whether a crossing would be found to be more than ordinarily hazardous: 
[A] crossing might be found to be more than ordinarily hazardous if it was 
in a thickly populated portion of a city; if the view of the tracks was 
obstructed because of the railroad itself or natural objects; if the crossing 
was frequented by heavy traffic so that approaching trains could not be 
heard; or if, for any reason, devices employed at the crossing were 
rendered inadequate to warn the public of the danger of an approaching 
train. 
Id. at 834 (quoting English, 13 Utah at 419-20, 45 P. at 50 (1896)). 
35. In light of the criteria set forth in English and reiterated in Duncan, the plaintiff in 
this case now argues that conditions present at the time of the accident, namely the auction 
barn and the traffic and commotion which accompany a livestock auction, meet the criteria of 
a "more than ordinarily hazardous" crossing. Plaintiff further argues that a factfinder should 
therefore be allowed to determine if the crossing was hazardous and, if so, whether 
defendant exercised reasonable care when driving the train across this particular railroad 
crossing. 
36. While not agreeing that the crossing was more than ordinarily hazardous, defendant 
argues that, assuming arguendo, "such a scenario does not impose a duty upon Union Pacific 
to reduce the train's speed below the federally mandated limit." See defendant's 
Memorandum in Support at 9, ^ 1. Defendant argues that the plaintiff in Easterwood also 
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alleged unsafe crossing conditions requiring additional warning devices. However, despite 
the Easterwood court's finding that plaintiff may have had a viable claim for an unsafe 
crossing, the Court found that the railroad had no duty to reduce the train's speed below the 
federal limit. Defendant argues that its train was traveling 10 m.p.h. below the federal limit 
and that because the FRA sets train speeds with crossing safety concerns already in mind, 
plaintiffs allegation of defendant's failure to reduce the speed of its train through the "more 
than ordinarily hazardous" crossing is unfounded. 
37. Defendant further argues that, when a crossing is deemed to be extrahazardous, a 
railroad's duty of care is limited to those unsafe conditions which it created or over which it 
has responsibility. See defendant's Reply Memorandum at 13. Defendant cites Gleave v. 
Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., 749 P.2d 660 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), and Duncan v. 
Union Pacific R. Co., 842 P.2d 832 (Utah 1990), in alleging that a railroad's duty of care 
extends only to obstructions to view or sound caused by the railroad or located on railroad 
right of way or property. Defendant then cites Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-19, which places a 
duty of care on property owners to remove vegetation or other obstructions on their property 
which constitute a traffic hazard by obstructing the view of any motor vehicle operator, and 
Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-14 et seq., which delegates to the Utah Department of Transportation 
(UDOT) the responsibility for regulating the safe travel of motorists on roads and highways, 
including those which pass over and across railroad tracks. 
38. This Court finds that, even if a jury could determine the existence of conditions that 
would make the accident site a "more than ordinarily hazardous" crossing, those conditions 
were not the responsibility of defendant. The noise around the auction was not something 
within defendant's control. The fact that there were "No Parking" signs posted around the 
area following the accident to prevent parked cars from obstructing drivers' views of the 
railroad track does not imply any lack of care on defendant's part prior to the accident, since 
such precautions are not the defendant's responsibility. 
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39. For these reasons, the Court finds that, even if the railroad crossing was a "more 
than ordinarily hazardous" crossing when a livestock auction was in progress, any unusually 
hazardous conditions resulting from the auction were not defendant's responsibility. 
U.C.A § 56-1-14 (Locomotive Bells & Whistles) 
40. Utah Code Ann. § 56-1-14 governs the operation of locomotive whistle and bell 
devices at public railroad crossings. It provides as follows: 
Every locomotive shall be provided with a bell which shall be rung 
continuously from a point not less than than 80 rods from any city or town 
street or public highway grade crossing until such city or town street or 
public highway grade shall be crossed, but, except in towns and at 
terminal points, the sounding of the locomotive whistle or siren at least 
1/4 of a mile before reaching any such grade crossing shall be deemed 
equivalent to ringing the bell as aforesaid. . . 
Id, According to defendant, where the grade crossing is in a rural area such as the one in 
question, the requirement is that either the bell or the whistle must be operated beginning "at 
least" 1320 feet from the crossing. Defendant argues that Engineer Puffer sounded both the 
bell and the whistle approximately 1/4 of a mile from the crossing, well in excess of the 
statutorily required distance of 1320 feet. 
41. Plaintiff argues that neither the driver nor the passenger of the car ever heard the 
train's whistle or bells prior to the accident. See Affidavit of Alicia Jensen, Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 3, and the recorded statement of Bruce Brinkmeier, 
Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition, Exhibit 4. Plaintiff alleges that the Pulse Electronics 
graph, attached to the Affidavit of Bruce Reading, indicates that no whistles or bells were 
sounded by the train as it approached the crossing. Plaintiff points to the statements of 
several witnesses who were near the crossing at the time of the accident. In their voluntary 
statements to police, Gerald and Whitney Hill made no mention of the train's whistle or bells 
at the time of the accident. Other witnesses also made voluntary statements to police and 
said nothing about hearing the train's whistle or bells at the time of the accident. However, 
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plaintiff has not provided the Court with any such statements in affidavit form, as required 
by Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
42. The failure of the Pulse Electronics graph to record the whistle or bells of the train 
prior to the accident is explained by George E. Ohlsson in his Supplemental Affidavit. Mr. 
Ohlsson stated that the event recorder device installed on the locomotive used only 8-track 
cassettes, which do not have sufficient channels to record everything relative to the operation 
of the train; specifically, the 8-track cassette does not have a channel for showing whether 
the horn or whistle was being sounded. See Supplemental Affidavit of George E. Ohlsson, f 
2. Mr. Ohlsson further stated that Union Pacific is beginning to replace the 8-track cassette 
event recorders with solid state event recorders which are capable of recording the sounding 
of a train's whistle. Id. at K 4. Furthermore, there is testimony in the police record to 
support defendant's claim that the train did sound its whistle and bells at some point before 
reaching the crossing, and that there were witnesses to the accident who did hear the train's 
whistle and bells. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit A (Voluntary 
Statements of Johnny Starks and Robert Craw). Ryan Puffer, engineer of the train, stated 
that he began sounding the whistle and the bells approximately 1/4 mile away from the 
crossing at 5950 South, and then continued operating the bells and whistle from 5950 South 
for another 1100 feet until the train reached the crossing at 650 West where the accident 
occurred. See defendant's Memorandum in Support, Exhibit C. 
43. The Court finds that, despite plaintiffs reference to the voluntary statements of 
witnesses who said nothing about having heard the train's bells or whistle, plaintiff did not 
submit any affidavits to that effect in accordance with the requirements of Rule 4-501 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration. Furthermore, there is no evidence to indicate that 
those witnesses were in a position to hear the bells and whistles if they had in fact been 
sounded. Conversely, defendant submitted the affidavit of the train's engineer, Ryan Puffer, 
who stated that he checked the train prior to leaving Milford to verify that the brakes, 
whistle, and headlights worked properly. Mr. Puffer also stated that he sounded the train's 
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bells and whistles for over 1/4 of a mile prior to reaching the crossing at 5950 South, and 
continued to sound the whistle beyond that crossing because he knew there was another 
crossing (the 650 West crossing) shortly beyond the 5950 South crossing. Finally, Mr. 
Puffer stated that he was sounding the whistle continuously as he watched the track and horse 
trailer cross the tracks just ahead of plaintiffs automobile. 
44. The Court finds the affidavit evidence presented is uncontradicted and that 
defendant did appropriately sound the train's bells and whistle as warning. 
Conclusion 
45. The Court concludes (a) that the speed of defendant's train was not a proximate 
cause of the accident; (b) that defendant was not responsible for any conditions which may 
have been present at the time of the accident and creating a "more than ordinarily hazardous" 
crossing; and (c) that defendant did sound the train's bells and whistle as it approached the 
crossing. Therefore, the Court finds no genuine issues of material fact remain as to 
defendant's liability to plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court grants defendant's Motion For 
Summary Judgment. 
Counsel for defendant is to prepare, within 15 days of the date hereof, an order 
consistent with the terms of this decision and submit it to opposing counsel for approval as to 
form prior to submission to the Court for signature. 
Dated at Provo, Utah this 15th day of May, 1995. 
JUD3E BOYD L. PARK 
cc: J. Clare Williams 
Allen Young 
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